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SECRETARIAT NOTE

4 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USIB

SUBJECT: Collection of Critical Intelligence on Indonesia

1. In late July 1962 COMOR determined that U-2 operations over Indonesia were not justified because of adequate [] information on Indonesian actions and intentions pertaining to West New Guinea. On 4 January 1963, because of CINCPAC concern that a reported buildup of Soviet technicians and military equipment in Indonesia might represent a possible Communist attempt to outflank our bases in the area and in Australia, COMOR reviewed the requirement for U-2 coverage of Indonesia and in the light of our experience with the Soviet buildup in Cuba, recommended several U-2 sorties against Indonesia. During USIB consideration of the subject, the State member requested a review of alternate means of collecting the required information. Both CIA and DIA reviewed their alternate capabilities for collection against Indonesia (Tabs A and B to USIB-D-41, 14/5) with the result that COMOR reiterated its previous recommendation that U-2 overflights be undertaken, and in addition, submitted a list of updated objectives to be covered. USIB on 30 January 1963 approved the COMOR recommendation, but the Special Group refused to authorize the operation.

2. On 6 February, you informed the USIB of the turn-down by the Special Group, your reservation of the right to reconsider with USIB and resubmit to higher authority. [] support of the requirement. The Board then referred the subject to the CCPC for a more comprehensive and thorough review of the possibility of fulfilling the requirement by means other than U-2 reconnaissance. On 15 February 1963, the CCPC in its report suggested the possibility of third party overflights or satellite photo coverage as alternatives to U-2 overflights.

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3. At its 20 February 1963 meeting, chaired by General Carter, USIB noted:

25X1C a. That [] did not propose to initiate airways reconnaissance flights in this area, and expressed the conviction that U-2 coverage was the only available method of obtaining the required information.

b. Dr. Scoville's statements on limitations of collection by satellite means.

c. General Carter's statement that he was prepared to recommend to the DCI that he appeal for approval of U-2 coverage of Indonesia.

d. The DIA member's request that this action be deferred until he could contact CINCPAC for his current views on the requirement for this intelligence.

4. We are informed that General Carroll will present the current DIA position on this matter in the light of CINCPAC's views. []
25X1A [] also expects to have more definite word on possible []
25X1C coverage.

[]
Executive Secretary

cc: Chairman, COMOR ✓
Chairman, CCPC